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This Comment addresses

an

emerging problem of the utmost

importance, identified by public and private companies, the government, and
academia in the legal and business environments.1 Companies are expected
both to implement controls for dealing with fraud internally and to provide

their auditors with detailed information on a wide range of corporate issues,
even if such information includes attorney-client privileged communications

1. See David M. Brodsky et al., The Auditor's Need For The Client's Detailed Information vs.
The Client's Need to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection: The
Debate, The Problems and Proposed Solutions, 2005 A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1. The auditors and investigators of companies must be given the
leeway to obtain as much information as possible to effectively perform their duties. See id. This
need must be balanced with the ability of companies to protect their communications from disclosure
with both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. See id. The problem
concerning waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine is extremely critical
to the functioning of capital markets and the general public interest, but the case law is convoluted.
See id. at 2; see also Andrew M. Apfelberg & William McC. Wright, Responding to Audit Inquiry
Letters: Working with Your Client to Provide Full Disclosure While Protecting Sensitive
Information, 18-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 38 (1999) (finding that "[c]ourts are split on whether the
response to an audit inquiry letter is a waiver of the protections of the work product doctrine.").
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or work product 2

This expectation has shaken the framework of the

attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.3
As early as 1977, federal courts began to create an exception to the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. This exception, now
known as the "limited waiver" or "special exception, ' 5 allows corporations
disclosing attorney-client privileged communications to the Securities and

Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), or other governmental
investigatory bodies, to maintain the privileged status of those
communications after disclosure.6 Part I of this Comment provides the
history of the attorney-client privilege.7 Part II provides the history of the

work product doctrine.'

Part III details a history of the weakening of the

attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine in relation to the
special waiver. 9 Part IV gives an overview of the current state of selective

waiver law and an analysis of how circuit courts and district courts differ in
their reasoning and holdings.' ° Part V addresses the areas of business and
law where the adoption or denial of a selective waiver may have drastic
implications, and what those implications may mean for the limited waiver."
Part VI concludes this Comment. 2

2. Brodsky et al., supranote 1, at 1.
3. The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, Jan. 2002,
http://www.darbylaw.com/news/news-article.asp?id=1701&archive=l (discussing the state of the
attorney-client privilege and finding that "[t]he moral of these legal campfire horror stories for inhouse counsel is simple. Your course of action must be consistent: either waive the privilege
entirely or maintain the confidentiality as to the entire communication. You must choose-but
choose wisely.").
4. See Beth S. Dorris, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-CorporationPrivilege,36
STAN. L. REv. 789, 797-98 (1984).
5. It seems lawyers, judges and scholars use the terms "limited waiver" and "selective waiver"
interchangeably in reference to this doctrine. I will do the same. But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Although the rule in
Diversified is often referred to as the 'limited waiver rule,' we prefer not to use that phrase because
the word 'limited' refers to two distinct types of waivers: selective and partial."). The Westinghouse
court found that "[s]elective waiver permits the client who has disclosed privileged communications
to one party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties. Partial waiver permits a client
who has disclosed a portion of privileged communications to continue asserting the privilege as to
the remaining portions of the same communications." Id.
6. See Dorris, supra note 4, at 797-800.
7. See infra notes 13-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 68-225 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 226-55and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
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I.

BACKGROUND: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Case law from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
elucidates the attorney's duty not to disclose a client's secrets. 3 It is not the
secretive nature of the communication, but the confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship upon which the attorney-client privilege is
founded. 14 Historically, the attorney-client privilege would not bar an
attorney from disclosing a communication if a third person was present
when the communication took place. 5
Courts imposed a secrecy16
requirement that implied both an objective and a subjective dimension.
Objectively, the communication must be kept secret between an attorney and
the client.' 7
Subjectively, the client must have intended that the
communication be secret and that the secrecy be maintained. 8 Modernly,
however, the attorney-client privilege's purpose is "to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration
ofjustice."'

9

13. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of ConfidentialityShould be
Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 868 (1998). Because the privilege was not instated unless the
communication occurred in secret, secrecy was both a condition precedent for the privilege to attach
and a necessary condition for the continuation of the privilege. Id. at 872.
14. See id. at 856-57. The secrecy requirement is often raised because it provides a theoretical
bright line for determining "when the privilege's protection begins and ends." Id. at 856. But
beyond this "convenient marker for determining the beginning and end of the protection, however,
the secrecy requirement does not further the goal of the attorney-client privilege .... " Id. at 857.
15. Id. at 859-62. The confidentiality requirement implies that the client wishes the information
communicated between the attorney and the client to remain confidential unless it is said in the
presence of others. See id. at 859. If made in the presence of others, the communication would be
presumed not to be confidential. See id.
16. Id. at 872-73. This notion is hotly contested. "The fallacy in this reasoning is that it equates
secrecy with safety; it assumes that a client who is not concerned with public embarrassment is also
unconcerned about being legally compromised by the use of these communications." Id. at 859-60.
Author Rice also discussed Wigmore, editor of the renowned treatise, who brought forth the notion
of secrecy within the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 859. His example of a third person
overhearing a communication and, therefore, being allowed to disclose what he hears, assumed that
"[tihe presence of a third person will usually be treated as indicating that the communication was not
confidential." See id. at 869 n.41 (quoting 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 245 (John Henry Wigmore ed., 16th ed. 1899)). This leads to the conclusion that a
level of secrecy must exist for the privilege to attach to a communication. See generally id. at 85460.
17. See id. at 872. If an attorney exposes the confidential information to a third party, such as a
government agency, the privilege may be abrogated. Id.
18. See id. at 872-73.
19. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (detailing the purpose of the attorneyclient privilege). Rice elucidated that this "secrecy requirement does not further the goal of the

As soon as the attorney and the client exchange information "in secret,"
"the privilege is created and remains viable until the secret . . . is out."2 ° The

privilege is waived when the litigant or his counsel voluntarily discloses
information to an adversarial third party.2' Whether this purposeful,

"selective waiver" to one party waives the privilege as to all parties is the

subject of this Comment.22 By assuring that the privileged communication
cannot be used against the client, the assumption is that the client will
communicate frankly and openly with his or her attorney.2 3 The attorneyclient privilege is founded upon the notion that legal consultation serves the
public interest, and that this interest is best promoted when the client feels

no qualms about fully informing his attorney of the facts of his legal

dilemma.24 The Federal Rules of Evidence have substantively implemented
the attorney-client privilege as it has been developed in common law.25
The benefits conveyed by this privilege to the legal profession and to the

pursuit of justice are disputed.26 It has been argued that if the purpose of law

attorney-client privilege---encouraging openness and candor in communications between an attorney
and client." Rice, supra note 13, at 857.
20. Rice, supra note 13, at 856-57 (internal citation omitted).
21. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.
2002) (finding that "[a]s a general rule, the 'attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary
disclosure of private communications by an individual or corporation to third parties."' (quoting In
re Grand Jury Proceedings October 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1996))). The privilege may
also be waived if the client's conduct implies disclosure or waiver. See In re ColumbiaHCA
Healthcare,293 F.3d at 294.
22. Arguments and reasoning supporting the arguments for and against the selective waiver are
presented in this Comment. See infra Parts III-V.
23. Rice, supra note 13, at 858.
24. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985). The
Weintraub Court commented on the integral aspect of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
setting, but noted that "[t]he administration of the attorney-client privilege in the case of
corporations, however, presents special problems. As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act
through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly
waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest." Id.
25. See American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 311 (2003)
[hereinafter ACTL]. Although usually applied narrowly, federal courts have employed Judge
Wyzanski's approach from United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950), in which Judge Wyzanski applied the privilege if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
ACTL, supra, at 311-12 (citing United Shoe Machinery, 89 F. Supp. at 358-59).
26. See ACTL, supra note 25, at 316-18. The attorney-client privilege often denies the
admission of powerful evidence that may be used by the other party. Id. at 316. For instance, a
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is to uncover the truth, this privilege only hinders the pursuit of justice.27
However, there is an equally-important necessity of ensuring the right of
every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having legal
knowledge so that the individual may have proper legal advice and a proper
defense.28 Furthermore, by promoting full disclosure to counsel, the truthfinding and justice-promoting principles are well served; 29 that is, in an
adversarial system, the client's interests are best achieved by loyal and fully
informed advocates.30
The benefits of the attorney-client privilege to the public are
undisputed.31 Similarly to the benefits of the work product doctrine, the
attorney-client privilege permits attorneys to zealously represent their
clients' interests. This safeguard fosters a public policy that seeks to assure
"the right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one
having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the

defendant's own admission of guilt can be protected by the privilege. Id. On the whole, however,
the legal system adheres to the understanding that the benefits of excluding evidence outweigh the
harm. Id.
27. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d
Cir. 1991). "Because the attorney-client privilege obstructs the truth-finding process, it is construed
narrowly." Id. at 1423. "The privilege 'protects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain
informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege."' Id. at 1423-24
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (emphasis added)).
28. See id. at 1423. "[T]he purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage 'full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients."' Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). "Full and frank communication is not an end in itself, however, but merely a
means to achieve the ultimate purpose of the privilege: 'promoting broader public interests ....'
Id. (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). The Westinghouse court continued, "[tihe attorney-client
privilege 'is founded upon the necessity... of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and
skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."' Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888)). But see Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 93 C 1143, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14488, at * 1314 (N.D. I11.
Oct. 3, 1995). The Neal court found that "[c]ourts need not allow a claim of privilege
when the party claiming the privilege seeks to use it in a way that is not consistent with the purpose
of the privilege." Id. at *13 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The
Neal court believed that "since the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to protect the
confidentiality of attorney-client communications in order to foster candor within the attorney-client
relationship, voluntary breach of confidence or selective disclosure for tactical purposes waives the
privilege." Id. at *13-14 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 818).
29. Rice, supra note 13, at 858.
30. See id.
31. See ACTL, supra note 25, at 316 ("This valuable social service of counseling clients and
bringing them into compliance with the law cannot be performed effectively if clients are scared to
tell their lawyers what they are doing, for fear that their lawyers will be turned into government
informants." (quoting United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996))).

former may have adequate advice and a proper defense."32 If the attorney
can easily be compelled to produce the privileged communications, the
client will not disclose any unfavorable information.33 The attorney will
then become nothing more than a messenger of the facts, rather than a
strategist of the client's case.
Similar to the attorney-client privilege that attaches between an
individual and an attorney, the corporate attorney-client privilege is between
the client-the corporation-and the attorney.3 4 Whether all employees
within a corporation should be able to gain the benefits of the attorney-client
privilege has been a subject of debate.35 The Upjohn Court further clarified

that the protection applies to3 6corporate internal investigations and the daily
task of corporate counseling.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE

Similar to the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine is
derived from common law.37 At common law, however, the work product

doctrine was much broader than the form in which it exists at present;
previously, anything in the attorney's possession was protected from
discovery. 3t The work product doctrine, as applied today, evolved from the
Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor.39 There, the Court held that
32. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984) (quoting Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960)).
33. See ACTL, supra note 25, at 316 ("Any perceived harm to the fact-finding process
attributable to the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine may be exaggerated because,
without these protections, clients may well choose not to disclose sensitive information to their
attorneys ... ").
34. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
35. See Rice, supra note 13, at 863 n.28 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95). The Court noted
that when facing a corporate scenario, employees beyond the "'officers and agents.., responsible
for directing [the company's] actions in response to legal advice' . . . will possess information
needed by the corporation's lawyers." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 (quoting United States v. Upjohn
Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979)). "Middle-level-and indeed lower-level--employees
can... embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these
employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to
advise the client .....
Id. Thus, the attorney-client privilege can and does commonly protect
almost every member of a corporation, given that anyone who has incriminating evidence can be
protected. See id.
36. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
37. See id. at 397.
38. See ACTL, supra note 25, at 314.
39. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Hickman Court was presented with the issue of the extent
opposing counsel may discover oral and written statements and other materials that were prepared by
an "adverse party's counsel" during the course of getting ready for litigation. Id. at 497. The Court
reasoned that these types of disclosures must be handled with special care, given that the
examination into an attorney's files may cause "unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's
work." Id. The Court strove to balance this potential harm with the public's interest in what the
Court defined as "reasonable and necessary inquiries." Id. The materials in question in Hickman
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"[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other
to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession., 40 However, the Court
tempered that broad statement with precautionary language:
[Where there is] an attempt, without purported necessity or
justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's
counsel in the course of his legal duties. . . ., it falls outside the
arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the
orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most
liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into
the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.
The Hickman Court also expounded upon the public and private purpose
of the work product doctrine. 42 From a public standpoint, the work product
doctrine enables attorneys to prepare their clients' cases without the worry of
opposing counsel discovering their strategies. 43 The Hickman Court stated
that the work product doctrine allows the attorney to "assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his
legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference.""
In this way, "lawyers act within the framework of our
system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients'
interests. ' The private purpose is straightforward: attorneys need privacy

were both written statements from witness interviewed by defense counsel and the contents of oral
interviews with witnesses, some of which had been summarized in memoranda prepared by the
defense lawyers. Id. at 498. The Court held that both were protected. Id. at 512-13.
40. Id. at 507-08.
41. 1d. at510.
42. See ACTL, supra note 25, at 314.
43. See id. (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that
materials "prepared in anticipation of litigation" by the attorney are not discoverable unless the party
seeking discovery can show a "substantial need of the materials.., and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). If a sufficient showing is made, "the court shall protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id.
44. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
45. Id. The Court stated that without the work product doctrine, "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices would inevitability develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of
cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the
clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly served." Id.

to serve as effective counsel,. and the work product privilege promotes this
privacy. 46

Although both the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine are derived from common law, they have significant differences.
The work product doctrine's purpose is to foster the proper presentation of a
party's case. 4 7 The work product privilege, however, is not absolute. 48 "[I]f

a party seeking discovery shows that 'relevant and non-privileged facts
remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is
essential to the preparation of one's case,"' then the opposing party may be
compelled to disclose the otherwise privileged material. 49 Furthermore, the
work product privilege is separable into fact work product and opinion work
product. 50 Fact work product is discoverable upon a showing of substantial
need and the party's inability to obtain the material any other way without
undue hardship. 5' Fact work product may be discoverable if, for instance, a
witness is very difficult to reach or if facts are relevant, non-privileged, and
give clues to other relevant information.52 Opinion work product includes
the attorney's impressions, opinions, ideas, and litigation strategies. 3 The
discoverability of opinion work product depends heavily upon circumstance
and the judge overseeing the case. 4

III. THE WEAKENING OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGES THROUGH THE SELECTIVE WAIVER

Although the attorney-client privilege traditionally required absolute
secrecy, the limited waiver repeals this notion.55 The limited waiver allows

46. See ACTL, supra note 25, at 314 ("[lIt is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." (citing Hickman,
329 U.S. at 510-11)).
47. SeeHickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11 n.9.
48. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
49. ACTL, supra note 25, at 314 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511). But see Permian Corp. v.
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the work product doctrine does
not allow production of certain documents already disclosed to the SEC, even though the party
waived the attorney-client privilege by such disclosure).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
51. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.
2002).
52. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
54. See generally Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the trial court
has an obligation to prevent the unjustified disclosure of the defense attorney's opinion work
product). Absent waiver, opinion work product is generally not discoverable. In re Columbia/HCA
Healthcare,293 F.3d at 294.
55. Rice, supra note 13, at 882-83. If a limited waiver is permitted, the body receiving the
disclosed information (typically the government) is able to use that information in a settlement with
the corporation without plaintiffs' firms later obtaining the information. Id. at 883. Logically, the
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a client to disclose confidential communications
to a third party and limit the
56
scope of the waiver to that third party only.
For example, federal prosecutors in investigatory organizations such as
the SEC and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") commonly ask corporate
counsel to waive the attorney-client privilege and turn over work product
and attorney-client protected materials.57 Corporations undoubtedly wish
they could hand over the documents for the sole purpose of assisting the
SEC or other federal agency. 58 However, without use of the selective or
limited waiver, a third party may use the disclosed information against the
corporation at some future time.5 9 Thus, the disclosure of this likelyincriminating evidence can be very costly to corporations.
Once faced with allegations of illegal behavior, a corporation, in most
cases, will conduct an internal investigation. 60 This investigation is usually
supervised by outside counsel, who will conduct the entire investigation by
using a detailed process designed to uncover every possible area of
wrongdoing.6'
Generally, the organization conducting the internal
investigation will inform the employees that their communications are not
privileged, which will result in many employees becoming less cooperative
with the investigation.62 This lack of cooperation leads to increased costs
and decreased accuracy and thoroughness.
Proponents of the special waiver argue that the efficiency of the
investigation would increase if the corporation were to allow the
investigating party to obtain whatever information it needed without fear of
losing the privileges which traditionally protect an attorney and his or her

selective waiver destroys the rationale that the original communication between the attorney and
client was protected solely because the communication was a "secret."
56. See id.
at 883.
57. See Brodsky et al., supra note 1,at 1-2. The reasons why the privileges are commonly asked
to be waived include the investigatory agencies' need for a complete and detailed account of the
illegal activities that took place. See id. The high costs of going to court discourage the agencies
from taking the case to trial, and the risk of loss caused by litigating against a federal investigatory
and enforcement agency encourages corporations to work with the agency by disclosing otherwise
confidential information. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution
Deferred?JudicialOversight of CorporateDeferred ProsecutionAgreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV.

1863, 1890-91 (2005).
58. See ACTL, supranote 25, at 319.
59. See Rice, supra note 13, at 883-84.

60. ACTL, supra note 25, at 317-18.
61. Id. at 317; see generally Brodsky et al., supra note 1, at 1-2.
62.

ACTL, supra note 25, at 317-18.

client.63 The SEC believes that voluntary production of information that is
protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine

greatly enhances the Commission's investigative efforts and, in 64most cases,
makes the Commission's investigations operate more efficiently.
In the past once the government had chosen which crimes to charge and
had obtained a conviction, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines previously
prescribed the sentence for the crime.65 Consequently, prosecutors were able
to exert a great measure of control over both the charging and sentencing
processes. 66 Although the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines are unconstitutional,67 the resulting effect of this ruling on the
government's leverage has yet to be determined.

IV. AN ANALYSIS
A.

OF THE SELECTIVE WAIVER

The SEC's Treatment of the Selective Waiver

The SEC issued the final guidelines of Section 307 of the SarbanesOxley Act ("the Act") on January 29, 2003, setting the minimum standards

63. See Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, White-Collar Crime: Is Selective Waiver of
Privilege Viable?, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 2003, at 2 (emphasizing how the Eighth Circuit adopted the
minority position in favor of the selective waiver, and did so based on the policy concerns implicated
in not finding in favor of the selective waiver); see also ACTL, supra note 25, at 318 (illustrating the
benefits of the attorney-client privilege in that "by facilitating internal investigations, the corporate
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine advance the administration of justice by enabling
the corporation to gather the information necessary to understand the relevant issues, to receive
competent legal advice, [and] to identify culpable employees ....
").
64. See Stephen M. Cutler etal., Document Preservation and Production in Connection with
Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations and Enforcement Actions, 1520 PLI CORP. L.
300, 422 (2005). But see Judith Bums, SEC Sued for Failing to Release CorporateDocuments,
DowJoNEs NEWSWlRES, Oct. 22, 2004. Ironically, the SEC has not always followed its own rules.
Author Judith Burns wrote that the SEC has been using the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to
obtain documents, but has not disclosed whether or not these documents exist. Id. Plaintiff research
firms-the firms who want these disclosures so they may inform the public of firms under
investigation--complain the SEC uses the law enforcement exemption to the FOIA to preclude the
documents from being released under the FOIA, but only when FOIA requests are made by these
particular firms. Id.
65. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). For further discussion regarding the overturning
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in relation to the selective waiver, see infra notes 226-38 and
accompanying text.
66. Rice, supra note 13, at 880-91. The federal prosecutor was acting as both the judge and the
jury. See id. The government decided which crimes would be charged with full knowledge of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines sentence for the crime, if proved. See id. Accordingly, the
prosecution had a great amount of leverage when negotiating with corporations and forcing those
corporations to disclose whatever the government deemed important. See id.
67. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
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of conduct for attorneys practicing before the SEC.68 The initial drafting of
the selective waiver read: "[w]here an issuer, through its attorney, shares
with the Commission information related to a material violation, pursuant to
a confidentiality agreement, such sharing of information shall not constitute
a waiver of any otherwise applicable privilege or protection as to other
persons., 69 This original draft of the selective waiver was not adopted by
the SEC.7°

In the implementation put forth by the SEC, the Commission recognized
the unresolved nature of the selective waiver issue among the courts.7
While noting the spilt in circuits, the SEC remarked it does not want to
waiver as part of a final rule, and did not do so, for several
adopt a selective
72
reasons.

First, many legal analysts have noted that the SEC does not, or
alternatively should not, have the power to "promulgate a rule that would
control decisions by state and federal courts concerning whether a disclosure
to the SEC, even if conditioned on a confidentiality agreement, waived the
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection., 73 Furthermore, if the
SEC did promulgate such a rule, it would be against the weight of authority
on the issue.74 And this alone could cause drastic problems in light of the
fact that some courts may simply refuse to enforce the "SEC waiver,"
leading to adverse consequences for attorneys and their clients who
"disclose information to the SEC pursuant to a confidentiality agreement"
with the understanding that their disclosures will be protected.75 But the
SEC stated it will continue to enter into confidentiality agreements when it
pursuant to
determines that its receipt of confidential information
76
interest.
public
the
further
will
agreements
confidentiality

68. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Corporate Governance Alert: SEC Issues Final
2003),
(Feb.
19,
Conduct
Attorney
Rules
Regarding
http://www.akingump.com/docs/publication/535.pdf.
69. Id. (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Proposed Selective Waiver Provision).
70. Id. The original proposal was substantially modified, but the concept remained the same
throughout. See id.
71. Id. The Commission noted the difficulty courts have had interpreting the selective waiver.
See id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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B. The CircuitSplit on Selective Waiver

Since 1978, the United States Courts of Appeals have been divided
regarding how to handle selective waiver. The three different positions are:
(1) selective waiver is permissible; (2) selective waiver is never permissible;
and (3) selective waiver is permissible only in situations where the
government has, prior to the disclosure, signed a binding confidentiality
agreement with the corporation.77
Although the attorney-client privilege is ordinarily waived by disclosure

of privileged information to a third party, a circuit split exists over whether
waiver occurs when disclosure is made to the government. 8 The Eighth
Circuit has held that the attorney-client privilege is waived only with respect
to the government, and the D.C. Circuit takes the position that the disclosure
of privileged information to any third party, including the government,
destroys the privilege. 79

The D.C. Circuit represents the majority rule,

which is followed by the Third Circuit and most others.t0

77. See generally In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
295-307 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court noted that "allowing a party to preserve the doctrine's
protection while disclosing work product to a government agency could actually discourage
attorneys from fully preparing their cases." In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litig., 192 F.R.D. 575, 580 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, the district court found that
"Columbia/HCA waived any protection from discovery under the attorney-client privilege or the
work product doctrine for documents disclosed to the government .... " Id.
78. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424-25. Without directly addressing the issue, the Westinghouse
court found that disclosures made with the reasonable expectation that they will not be given to an
adversary may not waive the work product doctrine. Id. at 1430. This begs the question: who is an
adversary? See id. The Third Circuit felt that disclosure to the government was disclosure to an
adversary. Id. at 1428-29. Accordingly, the disclosure waived the work product doctrine and the
issue of whether a confidentiality agreement existed was of no relevance. See id. at 1429-30. "Thus,
allowing a party to preserve the doctrine's protection while disclosing work product to a government
agency could actually discourage attorneys from fully preparing their cases." Id. at 1430.
79. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (permitting the attorneyclient privilege to be selectively waived); see also Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; cf In re
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that waiving the attorney-client
privilege for one waives it for all). The Third Circuit reasoned that "attorneys are still free to
prepare their cases without fear of disclosure to an adversary as long as they and their clients refrain
from making such disclosures themselves. Creating an exception for disclosures to government
agencies may actually hinder the operation of the work-product doctrine." Westinghouse, 951 F.2d
at 1429.
80. See, e.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1367; see also Westinghouse, 951 F.2d
at 1421.

734

[Vol. 33: 723, 2006]

The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client Privilege
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

81
The Eighth Circuit decided in DiversifiedIndustries, Inc. v. Meredith
that selective waiver is permissible.82 Diversified Industries ("Diversified"),
a Delaware corporation operating in Missouri, was a manufacturer and
processor of scrap copper, brass, and brass products.83 During a shareholder
fight, it became clear that Diversified had been paying bribes to obtain
business.84
Diversified formed an independent audit committee and
prepared an internal report on the issue with the assistance of the law firm
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, LLP.8 5 Likely through the use of a subpoena,
the SEC obtained a copy of this report.86 One of the parties bribed by
Diversified brought suit in order to obtain the audit report, prepared by
Arthur Andersen. The district court granted the order requiring Diversified

81. Although not the touchstone of the Eighth Circuit's analysis, the court analyzed the two tests
that have developed in federal courts examining when employee communications are considered the
corporate client's communications. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 608. The first test is the "control
group" test. See id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 210 F. Supp. 483, 48385 (E.D. Pa. 1962)). In this test, an employee's statements are "not considered a corporate
communication unless the employee 'is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of [an] attorney."' Id.
(quoting Westinghouse, 210 F. Supp. at 485). The second test states that an employee's
communications are classified as the corporate client's communications when "an employee of a
corporation.., makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and
where the subject matter ...is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment."
Id. (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)). The
choice between the two tests can lead to a communication raising the need for the selective waiver
analysis, or the communication being completely outside the scope of the selective waiver. In
Diversified, the court found that the materials in question were within the scope of the selective
waiver. See id. at 609. The Eighth Circuit adopted the second test because the first is "inadequate
for determining the extent of a corporation's attorney-client privilege." Id.
82. See id. at 610.
83. Id. at 607.
84. Id. During proxy fight litigation involving Diversified in 1975, it was revealed that
Diversified may have maintained a "slush" fund to bribe clients, including Weatherhead
Corporation. Id. "On July 9, 1976, Weatherhead filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that
Diversified conspired with Weatherhead employees to sell Weatherhead an inferior grade of
copper.... " Id. "[lln return for accepting the inferior copper, [certain] Weatherhead employees
were paid bribes out of this 'slush' fund." Id.
85. Id. at 607-08. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering also conducted a professional investigation and
interviewed many employees, analyzed the accounting data, evaluated propriety of past transactions
and made recommendations for possible future action. Id. at 610. The court considered whether
employee interviews were within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Id.
86. Id. at 611.
87. Id. at 615 (Henley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

to produce the documents in question."8 The Eighth Circuit, however, found
that these materials were protected by the attorney-client privilege.

9

The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because the documents were disclosed
in a separate and non-public SEC investigation, only a limited waiver-to
the SEC-occurred. 90 The court went on to state that "[t]o hold otherwise

may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to
employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order
to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.

'

The Eighth Circuit allowed the selective waiver for the primary purpose
of encouraging corporations to undertake internal investigations. 9 The
Eighth Circuit is the only appellate court to have decided in favor of the
selective waiver. 93 However, the dissent in the Sixth Circuit case In re
Columbia HCA/Healthcare, written by Judge Boggs, is persuasively written

and argues that a selective waiver is necessary and would invaluably
94
increase the amount of information available in government investigations.
Judge Boggs believed that a corporation's readiness to disclose harmful
or detrimental information to investigators should not be given too much
credit. 95

The majority argued that without a limited waiver rule, more

88. Id. at 606-08.
89. Id. at 611. "We conclude that these employee interviews are confidential communications of
the corporate client and entitled to the attorney-client privilege." Id. But see id. at 612 n. I (Henley,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As will be seen, Ido not consider that the attorneyclient privilege is available to Diversified in this case. Nor do I consider that the material in question
is protected 'work product'....").
90. Id. at 611. The court's holding is founded upon case law in other subjects. See, e.g., id.
(citing United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1961), vacated on other grounds, 368
U.S. 14 (1961) (involving the ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in a subsequent criminal investigation)); id. (citing Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v.
Storck, 297 F. Supp. 1122, 1123 (D. Haw. 1969) (holding that testimony during a suppression
hearing is not admissible in a subsequent criminal trial)).
91. Id. "[W]e note that the litigants are not foreclosed from obtaining the same information from
non-privileged sources. Litigants may still examine business documents,... interview nonemployees, obtain preexisting documents and financial records not prepared by Diversified for the
purpose of communications with the law firm in confidence." Id.
92. See id. The Westinghouse court also acknowledged that "[t]he Eighth Circuit's sole
justification for permitting selective waiver was to encourage corporations to undertake internal
investigations." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d
Cir. 1991).
93. Diversified remains the sole supporter of the limited waiver. See In re Subpoenas Duces
Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum court held that
although cooperation with a government agency is doubtlessly virtuous, it in no way furthers the
attorney-client relationship. Id. The court felt that if the client feels the need to keep his
communications with his attorney confidential, the client should continually assert the traditional
attorney-client privilege-and at the "traditional price"---even if it is the SEC asking for disclosure.
Id. (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
94. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307 (6th Cir.
2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
95. See id.
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participants will have access to the disclosed information. 96 However, Judge
Boggs does not presuppose corporate America's veracity.97
Judge Boggs argued that the true choice is either disclosure only to
government investigatory agencies, or "no disclosure at all." 98 He wrote that
a "government exception" would increase the total amount of information
available to the government99 and would aid in the truth-seeking process and
further the public's interest.
When the government undertakes an investigation it is likely to be
pursuing much different goals than a private attorney.' O Private litigants
typically have monetary goals in mind, and most have unlimited resources
with which to pursue these goals.'
The government, in contrast, generally
10 2
seeks the truth, without a personal monetary stake in the investigation.
Consequently, when the government seeks privileged information, it is

96. Id.
97. See id. This is a wise conclusion, given the recent corporate scandals.
98. See id. (emphasis omitted). In explaining, Judge Boggs noted that if the material is never
disclosed, it will remain protected by the privilege, even against plaintiffs' firms. Id. at 312.
Therefore, the question is not whether to allow disclosure to private litigants after disclosure to the
government, but instead, whether there should be a privilege that would simply "create incentives
that permit voluntary disclosures to the government .. " Id. "[E]ither the government gets the
disclosure made palatable because of the exception, or neither the government nor any private party
becomes privy to the privileged material." Id.
99. Id. at 312. Judge Boggs gave a scathing review of the majority's contention that a special
waiver would only obfuscate the truth seeking process. See id. He argued against this notion with
the assertion that the majority simply missed the mark in its analysis. Id. (citing id. at 303 (majority
opinion)). Judge Boggs explained that "[tihe government is not about cover-ups, rather it should
'act to bring to light illegal activities.' I wonder what exactly the [majority] thinks the government
would be doing if permitted to encourage voluntary disclosure through confidentiality agreements."
Id. (internal citation omitted). Judge Boggs believed that "[tihe government either could use the
information to find additional evidence or could present the privileged information if it decided to
initiate a criminal prosecution or civil action." Id. He noted that the confidentiality agreement is not
what protects the documents from disclosure, "but instead the privilege itself." Id. Judge Boggs
believed that if a limited waiver is not permitted, more information will be kept in the dark. Id.
"The exception aids the government in bringing violations of the law to light." Id. at 312-13.
Moreover, Judge Boggs indicated who he thinks is "generally more important" as between the
government and private litigants. Id. at 312. Where he saw private litigants operating with an
incentive to "press the legal envelope," he viewed government officials as being more selective, and
therefore more likely to promote the public's interest. Id. Thus, allowing the limited waiver would
lead to, on the whole, more information being available. Id. In comparison, denying the limited
waiver would cause "an incomplete view of the facts, where exposed evidence would be
contradicted by concealed privileged information." Id. at 310.
100. Seeid.at312.
101. Id.
102. See generally infra note 170 and accompanying text.

unlikely that the information
will be as broad as a private litigant would seek
10 3
in a similar situation.
Judge Boggs dismissed the majority's review of the law, given that the
majority only addressed whether to allow a limited waiver or not.' 4 He
envisioned four scenarios: (1) accept the limited waiver rationale;0 5 (2)
reject the limited waiver, but without discussion of whether a confidentiality
agreement would be valid;' 0 6 (3) reject the limited waiver withstanding a
confidentiality agreement;'0 7

and (4) allow the limited waiver with

08
disclosures between one government agency and another. 1
The majority only distinguished between courts that allow the limited

waiver and those that do not, but Judge Boggs believed the court should
analyze the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine
separately under each scenario.' 0 9 Judge Boggs thought the "third-party

waiver rule" (limited waiver) need not be affected by the justifications of the
attorney-client privilege." 0 However, when the question is whether the
attorney-client privilege is waived, the burden must shift to the

"presumption in favor of preserving the privilege.""'

The attorney-client privilege acknowledges that once a client has

disclosed information to a third party, "the client does not appear to have
been desirous of secrecy."'"12 The majority used this notion and suggested
that if clients are willing to disclose information to third parties without the
privilege, then "chances are that they would also have divulged it to their

103. Id.
104. In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare,293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)). In
support of this contention, Judge Boggs argued that "exclusion of privileged information conceals no
probative evidence that would otherwise exist without the privilege." Id. at 309. Therefore,
allowing the limited waiver would result in no less information being available to attorneys. Id.
106. Id. at 307 (citing Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
107. Id. at 307-08 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1427 (3d Cir. 1991)).
108. Id. at 308 (citing United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 686 (lst Cir. 1997)). The most
interesting point Judge Boggs made is that the majority spun the current state of the law to appear
favorable to its position. Id. at 307. While explaining the circuit courts' split, he added that
although the Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to directly accept the limited waiver, only one other
circuit court has actually faced the same issue. Id. at 307-08. Every opinion coming down against
the selective waiver, save Westinghouse, has either been within situation (1), (2), or (4), supra, not
(3). See id. Directly rejecting the selective waiver, even though the corporation entered into a
facially valid confidentiality agreement, has occurred only once. Id. (citing Westinghouse, 951 F.2d
at 1427).
109. Id. at 308-14.
110. Id. at308.
11. Id. (quoting In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 1997)) (noting that courts should
always begin an analysis of the attorney-client privilege with the presumption of preserving the
privilege).
112. Id. at 309 (citing 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2311, at 599 (2d ed. 1961)).
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attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege."'" 3 But this
conclusion presupposes that the client knows the future.' 4 It is impossible
to accurately define the motivation behind the privileged communication at
the time the communication was made." 5 Specifically, the fact that the
client was willing to disclose privileged information to the government at a
later time says nothing about whether the client would have
communicated
16
with its attorney-without the privilege-at the beginning."
Furthermore, Judge Boggs illustrated the flaw in arguing that the
attorney-client privilege is not meant to protect communications between the
government and a private individual." 7 The relevant question is not whether
the communication between the government and the individual is protected,
but "whether the communication between the government and the holder of
the privilege waives the already existing privilege.""' 8
One of the leading arguments against the selective waiver, the swordand-shield argument, can be disproved. Requiring that there either be full
confidentiality or full disclosure forces courts to conclude that corporations
will give up the most favorable information while guarding against
disclosure of the most damaging."l 9 If a corporation knows that the selective
waiver will not offer protection, it will not disclose possibly incriminating
privileged information and the court will not have a complete view of the
facts of the case. 120 Although it is true that the holder of the privilege should
not be able to selectively waive the privilege to some parties but retain it for
others, this concern should not weigh against the strong public policy

113. Id. (quoting Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424).
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id. Judge Boggs immediately dismissed the majority's conclusion that the limited waiver
"has little, if any, relation to fostering frank communication between a client and his or her
attorney." Id. (quoting id. at 302 (majority opinion)). He believed that this argument leaves out the
element of time. Id. Because attorneys and their clients cannot predict the future, there is no reason
to assume motivation behind the communication from a later disclosure. Id. Judge Boggs noted:
That a client is willing to disclose privileged information to the government at time T2
indicates very little indeed about whether she would have communicated with her
attorney, absent the promise of the privilege, at time TI. In the meantime, the client
certainly has learned more about intervening events and perhaps has become more legally
sophisticated (through the informed legal advice arising from her candid communication
with her attorney).

Id.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Seeid. at309n.2.
Id.
See id. at 310 (citing United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (8th Cir. 1998)).
See id. (citing United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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considerations involved in aiding the efficiency of government
investigations. 121
Thus, if there must be some allowance of the tactical advantages
involved with the selective waiver, consideration must be given to the

negative effects of such conduct. Instead of being overly cautious in
protecting a litigant's strategic disclosure, one must weigh both sides of the
argument. Ultimately, it becomes an issue of public policy: do the benefits
gained by the government being able to have the privileged information

outweigh the harm done
by certain litigants using the rule to strategically
1 22

disclose information?
The harms of selective disclosure are not entirely defined. 123 Because of
this vagueness, a decision should not be made against the selective waiver
without considering the benefits, especially when the benefits of allowing
the selective waiver have readily identifiable strengths.124 For example,
government investigations will be exponentially aided and increasingly

121. See id. at 310-11; see also Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the
privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others .... ). But it is
important that, if there is a way to protect against the sword-and-shield predisposition of disclosing
parties, government investigations be aided in any reasonable way possible.
See In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare,293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's rule
rejecting selective waiver will merely increase the cost of a party's cooperation with the
government). Thus, by rejecting selective waiver, government investigations will become more
difficult because of decreased cooperation, so the government will need some other reasonable aid to
ensure effective investigations.
122. See In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare,293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
123. See supra notes 68-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of many issues that have
arisen with the selective waiver rule and the problems that could result from adopting it. For
example, the SEC has recognized that many of the circuit courts are split on the issue of the selective
waiver and several legal analysts have noted the potential problems that could arise if the SEC were
to adopt the rule. See id.; see also Nancy Horton Burke, The Price of Cooperating with the
Government: Possible Waiver of the Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L.
REv. 33, 35 (1997) (noting that several circuit courts have refused to embrace the selective waiver
and that their reason for doing so "varied depending on the underlying factual circumstances").
Author Burke noted that many of the courts rejected use of the waiver based "largely on public
policy grounds" rather than some specific harm that may result from the rule. See id.; see also
Dorris, supra note 4, at 801-15 (detailing problems with the selective waiver and proposing that the
waiver be abandoned).
124. Some scholars have noted that "[a] legal system that fails to assure public companies the
benefits of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection denies those companies
the effective assistance of counsel when potentially illegal corporate behavior is discovered."
Brodsky et al., supra note 1, at 14. For example, when a company discloses "information to auditors
regarding the handling of whistleblower allegations, companies risk waiving privileges to the extent
that the information includes attorney-client communications, witness interviews, advice of counsel,
and other legal work and analyses." Id. at 14 n.47. "This type of information is at the heart of what
companies reasonably expect-through long-standing and sound precedent-will be protected from
actual and potential litigation adversaries." Id.
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efficient with the allowance of the selective waiver.125 By not allowing the
selective waiver, a court is simply increasing the costs of cooperating with
the government.126 This may be best explained in the sense that the current

"complete waiver" waives all privileged information to a third party once the
information is disclosed, leaving corporations with little incentive27 to be
completely honest when disclosing possibly incriminating evidence.
Because a complete waiver occurs when the privileged information has
been disclosed to the government, the penalty for waiver is high.' 2 8
Detractors of the limited waiver rule put forth the contention that there are

"other means" by which the information may be obtained.129 However, the
subpoenas and discovery process which would produce this information

result in more time and money being expended for a similar effect. 30
Furthermore, assuming the government can access this information simply
because they have "other means" may prove too conclusory. 131

Two far more compelling reasons for allowing the selective waiver are
still unaddressed. When the government undertakes an investigation, 32
it
usually begins with a much different burden than a private litigant.
Allowing a privilege to the government to aid investigations would not only

125. But see id. at 16 n.54 (noting that a group "of attorneys who practice before the SEC...
commented that internal investigations conducted by a company to respond to fraud allegations may
cause more harm than good because the SEC now regularly demands waiver of privileges, and [t]hat
information is then discoverable by plaintiffs' lawyers in civil litigation" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
126. The SEC has stated that "[tihe choice is thus between disclosure only to govemment
agencies, which will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental investigations, and no
disclosure at all-not a choice between disclosure only to government agencies and disclosure to all
parties." Brief for The Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant
at 18, United States v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-10511), 2004 WL 1394246
(citing In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare,293 F.3d at 307). Thus, the SEC felt that a disclosure to the
Commission should "not result in waiver of work-product protection because preserving workproduct protection is in the public interest." Id. at 1.
127. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare,293 F.3d at 310 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997)).
128. But see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (noting that if selective waiver is
permitted, corporations could limit the scope of their waivers).
129. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997)).
130. Seeid.at3ll.
131. Seeid.
132. See id. at 312. Judge Boggs found this argument particularly convincing. See id. He stated
that "government investigators and prosecutors start at a tactical disadvantage to private plaintiffs
given the procedural protections afforded criminal defendants against the government ....
I am
comfortable.., providing a clear exception for government investigations, and leaving private
litigants out." Id.
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be of practical benefit, but also procedural benefit. 133

Another concern

regarding a so-called "government/corporation privilege" is the notion that
the investigatory agency may become lenient with the corporation. 134 In

light of the SEC's inclination to be friendly with corporations facing
scrutiny, it would be
to the public's peril if the SEC relaxed its enforcement
135

of legal standards.
However, most courts believe that always allowing a limited waiver is
not in the public's best interest. Some courts have adopted the approach of
approving the "some selective waiver" rule. 136
This middle-ground
approach is founded upon the notion that if the disclosing corporation and
the government specifically reserve the privilege through a confidentiality
agreement prior
to the disclosure, then the confidentially agreement should
37
be binding.'

The seminal case in the "some selective waiver" history is Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. Shamrock Broadcasting

Co.'38

As with most cases dealing with a limited waiver, Teachers

Insurance involved an investigation into alleged wrongdoing which occurred

during the 1970s. 139 The investigation dealt primarily with a series of
questionable loans by Shamrock Broadcasting Company. 140
Through
subpoenas, the SEC accumulated numerous documents regarding these
questionable dealings. 14' Because Teachers was a shareholder of Shamrock

133. See id.
134. Dorris, supra note 4, at 820.
135. See id.
136. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that "disclosure is not a waiver if it is compelled by court order or made
pursuant to a stipulation reserving the right to assert the [attorney-client or work product]
privilege[s]." (internal citations omitted)).
137. See id..; see also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993) (agreeing that
the "selective assertion of privilege should not be merely another brush on an attorney's palette,
utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage."); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum,
738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that a "client cannot be permitted to pick and choose
among his opponents, waiving the privilege as to some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality
to obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has
already compromised for his own benefit." (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,
1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981))). But see Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1220-21 (rejecting the pick and choose
theory of the attorney-client privilege).
138. Teachers Ins., 521 F. Supp. at 638.
139. Id. at 639-40. The plaintiff ("Teachers") sued the Starr Broadcasting Group, Inc. "to recover
damages for Starr's failure to honor Teachers' exercise of two Starr stock warrants at the exercise
price to which Teachers contended it was entitled." Id. at 639. Once the lawsuit began, Starr
merged with Shamrock. Id. The parties agreed that Shamrock would be the defendant, not Starr.
Id.
140. Id. at 640.
141. Id. The subpoena stated "that the SEC may seek a court order directing compliance should
Teachers not produce the documents called for . " I.
Id. (citing Subpoena issued by the SEC (Sept.
22, 1976)). The subpoena also stated that the information the SEC sought could be used "[iun any
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Broadcasting Company, it wished to obtain the accumulated documents. 4 2
The SEC subpoena specifically stated that the information sought was to be
used "principally for the purpose of investigating possible violations of the
federal securities laws.' ' 143 Although Shamrock did give a principal reason
for the disclosure, it did not enter into a confidentiality agreement with the
SEC.'" After a thorough review of the current state of the law, the New
York district court created the "some limited waiver" rule.145
The Teachers Insurance court found that "disclosure to the SEC should
be deemed to be a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless the
right to assert the privilege in subsequent proceedings is specifically
reserved at the time the disclosure is made."'' 4 6 The court's logic in allowing
a limited waiver when properly reserved by the corporation was that "[i]t
does not appear that such a reservation would be difficult to assert, nor that it
would substantially curtail the investigatory ability of the SEC.' 47 The
court concluded,
Accordingly, the Court will not rule that Teachers has not waived
the privilege as a matter of law .... The parties shall contact the
Court within five days of the date of this Opinion... [to determine]
whether the documents sought were in fact privileged, which
documents were turned over to the SEC, and whether express
claims of confidentiality were made48as to the documents turned over
at the time they were so disclosed.

proceeding where the Federal securities laws are in issue or in which the Commission or past or
present members of its staff is a party or otherwise involved in an official capacity." Id. (quoting
Subpoena issued by the SEC (Sept. 22, 1976)).
142. See id.
at 639.
143. Id.at 640.
144. Id. at 639.
145. Id. at 646.
146. Id. at 644-45 (emphasis added). But the court was wary of another attribute of the privilege.
a party cannot, by selective
"[The privilege] cannot be used 'as a sword,' offensively i.e.....
invocation of the privilege, disclose documents or give testimony favorable to that party while
failing to disclose cognate material unfavorable to that party." Id. at 641. "As a corollary to this
principle, courts have ruled that when a party discloses part of an otherwise privileged
communication, he must in fairness disclose the entire communication, or at least so much of it as
will make the disclosure complete and not misleadingly one-sided." Id.
147. Id.at 646.
148. Id.

743

The Second Circuit's opinion, In re Steinhardt Partners,L.P., involved
an SEC investigation into the treasuries market. 149 In compliance with the

SEC, Steinhardt prepared information to disclose to the Commission.' 5
Although this information was labeled "FOIA Confidential Treatment
Requested," no actual confidentiality agreement was in place before the

disclosure to the government agency."'

The Second Circuit, although

declining "to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary disclosures to the
government waive
5 2 the work product protection," rejected the selective
waiver doctrine.
The linchpin of the court's analysis for rejecting the selective waiver
was that the SEC's Enforcement Division acted as an adversary when it
subpoenaed the corporation, therefore abrogating the attorney-client
privilege. 153 Interestingly, although the In re Steinhardt court rejected the
selective waiver in this instance, it noted that establishing a rigid rule against
the selective waiver would fail to anticipate situations in which the
disclosing party and the government share an interest in developing legal
strategies. 154 The court further implied that it would have to consider the
facts differently if there was an explicit agreement.'
This leads to the
plausible conclusion that the Second Circuit will not protect corporations

149. 9 F.3d 230 (2d. Cir. 1993). Specifically, "highly publicized allegations" of theft in the
market for Treasury notes were occurring in June 1991. Id. "[T]he SEC began an informal
investigation of the Treasury markets. As part of this informal investigation, the SEC asked
Steinhardt, among many others, to provide certain documents related to its trading activities." Id.
Following the informal investigation in 1991, the SEC issued a subpoena to Steinhardt. Id.
150. Id. at 232. This was a voluntary submission to the SEC which contained legal theories. See
id. at 234.
151, Id. at 232. For further discussion of the Freedom of Information Act and any possible
conflict with the selective waiver, see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
152. In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236. The court held that "selective assertion of privilege should
not be merely another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or
strategic advantage." Id. at 235.
153. Id. at 234. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that "the SEC stood in an
adversarial position to Steinhardt when it requested assistance." Id. The court further explained that
this was not a situation in which two parties were acting in a benign manner towards each other. Id.
This was not a routine investigation by the SEC; to the contrary, it was an investigation into
corporate wrongdoing, and both parties were aware of the possible consequences. Id. The court
reasoned that "[t]he determinative fact in analyzing the adversarial nature of the relationship is that
Steinhardt knew that it was the subject of an SEC investigation, and that the memorandum was
sought as part of this investigation." Id. The court supported the assertion that the relationship was
adversarial by noting that the requests were from the SEC's Enforcement Division, which enforces
laws and regulations addressing corporate fraud. Id. Although the investigation had not yet turned
into a formal "enforcement proceeding," the mere presence of the SEC's investigation into the
company was sufficient for the court to find that the relationship was adversarial in nature. Id. The
court denied Steinhardt's contention that simply because it voluntarily cooperated with the SEC, the
relationship was not adversarial. Id.
154. Id. at 236.
155. Id. ("Steinhardt does not dispute the SEC's assertion that there was no agreement that the
SEC would maintain the confidentiality of the memorandum."). Id. at 232.
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claiming protection under the Freedom of Information Act, but will honor a
true confidentiality agreement. 5 6

The In re Steinhardt court stated,

however, that it was not adopting an easy-to-apply rule and that
determinations regarding voluntary disclosures to the government had to be
made on a case-by-case basis, leaving open the 157
idea that selective waiver
may occur with a valid confidentiality agreement.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Dellwood Farms, Inc. v.

Cargill, Inc. in 1997.158 The court was very clear as to why the selective
waiver would not be allowed in the case before it. 159

Yet, it did not

completely disallow the selective waiver in other instances, stating that "the
possessor of the privileged information should have been more careful, as by
obtaining an agreement
by the person to whom they made the disclosure not
' 160
to spread it further.

The Sixth Circuit has taken a view contrary to that of the Eighth, barring
any selective waiver. 161 The In re Columbia/HCA Healthcarecourt found

that the "uninhibited approach adopted out of wholecloth by the Diversified
court has little, if any, relation to fostering frank communication between a
client and his or her attorney. ' , 162

The court pointed out that allowing a

selective waiver can only promote full and frank communication between
163
the government and the corporation, not the corporation and its attorney.

The Sixth Circuit explained that the government is actually an adverse party,
and neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine has an

156. See id. at 230-36.
157. Seeid. at236.
158. 128 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, the FBI began investigating charges that Archer
Daniels Midland ("ADM") was conspiring with agricultural producers to fix prices of feed and food
additives. Id. at 1124. During the investigation, the FBI recorded over one hundred hours of audio
and video recordings of conversations of those involved in the conspiracy. Id. "In 1995 the
Department of Justice began presenting evidence to grand juries. The grand jury investigating price
fixing of lysine [had] returned several indictments to which ADM and several other defendants [had]
pleaded guilty." Id. "To induce ADM to plead guilty to these criminal antitrust offenses the
government, without seeking or obtaining any kind of confidentiality agreement or protective order,
played some of the tapes for the law firm representing ADM's outside directors." Id. The lawyers
took notes of the played tapes. Id.
159. Id. at 1127 (holding that "failing to be careful-committing a mistake that while careless
may also be harmless-is not by itself a compelling reason for stripping a person of his privilege.").
160. Id.
161. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th
Cir. 2002); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977).
162. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare,293 F.3d at 302 (footnote omitted). The court alluded to
the Diversified court's wholesale adoption of the selective waiver. See id.
163. Id.

interest in protecting adversaries from each other. 64 The Sixth Circuit
distinguishes the Diversified opinion by explaining that the cases cited by
the Diversified court are actually Fifth Amendment cases-Diversifieddrew
the analogy that a person should not be forced to incriminate themselveswhich are unrelated to the attorney-client privilege. 65 The court's strongest
arguments, however, remain within the sword-and-shield and common law

areas.
The In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare court further urged away from

selective waiver under the sword-and-shield argument.

66

The court

explained that allowing the attorney-client privilege to be selectively waived

will then turn the selective waiver into "merely another brush on an
attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic
advantage." 67 The Sixth Circuit, denying any selective waiver whatsoever,
explained that the attorney-client privilege is more of a common law right
than a contractually-designed weapon for corporations to have at their
disposal. 168 While rejecting the selective waiver, the court acknowledged
that there are advantages to allowing a selective waiver: (1) governmental
efficiency is aided as corporations are more willing to participate; (2)

corporations may feel that they may disclose more honestly than before,
engaging in an almost self-policing; and (3) it encourages settlements of
disputes between the government and corporations by encouraging
cooperative exchange of information.169 In responding to these contentions,

164. Id. "Attorney-client privilege was never designed to protect conversations between a client
and the Government-i.e., an adverse party-rather, it pertains only to conversations between the
client and his or her attorney." Id.
165. Id. at 302 n.22. Although the Sixth Circuit did a superb job of distinguishing Diversifiedon
other grounds, this is the court's weakest contention. See id. at 302-03. The Fifth Amendment is
crafted to protect an individual from self-incrimination. See id. at 298 n.15. When the SEC forces,
coerces, or otherwise manipulates a corporation to disclose privileged information, it is, in effect,
using the powers given to it by the government to extract this information. If this disclosure, given
in good faith, is then used against the individual again in either a civil or criminal capacity, the Fifth
Amendment may be involved. However, it is true that nowhere within the rationale for the attorneyclient privilege will one find full and frank communication with the government. Id. at 302.
166. See id. at 303. "Once 'the privacy for the sake of which the privilege was created [is] gone
by the [client's] own consent' . . . the privilege does not remain in such circumstances for the mere
sake of giving the client an additional weapon to use or not at his choice." Id. at 302-03 (quoting
Green v. Crapo, 62 N.E. 956, 959 (1902)). "The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose
among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality as
to others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has already
compromised for his own benefit." Id. at 303 (citing Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,
1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
167. Id. at 302 (citing In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
168. See id. at 303. The court does acknowledge, however, that the Teachers Insurance approach,
which honors a specific and well-crafted confidentiality agreement, does protect the expectations of
both parties. Id. However, the Sixth Circuit stated that such an approach does not protect public
policy, which is a goal of the attorney-client privilege. See id.
169. Id.
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the court argued that the government's efficiency will not be aided by
allowing selective waiver because the courts only draw a line between one
litigant and another. 70 The court further urged the government to consider
the public policy implications of governmental agencies entering into
confidentiality agreements, 7 ' as it believed the truth-finding process is
significantly hindered by the SEC when the agency enters into such
agreements.'
Investigatory agencies (including the SEC and the DOJ)
should be acting to expose wrongdoers and their companies to the public,
not working with the corporations to conceal their illegal activities.' 73

Furthermore, the government has numerous tools at its disposal to bring
illegal activities to light, and its "agencies 'have means to secure the
information they need' other than through voluntary cooperation achieved
via selective waiver."' 7 4

The In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare court

explained that one risk of entering into a tactical confidentiality agreement is
that the agreement will not be honored. 175 Opting to enter into a
confidentiality agreement is a tactical and strategic decision made by
counsel.'7 6 Maintaining the privilege in this case would only result in

unpredictable and uncertain outcomes, with courts trying to decipher which

170. Id. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning underlying this rationale is that it is of no consequence
whether the government or a private law firm undertakes the investigation, because "[a] plaintiff in a
shareholder derivative action or a qui tam action who exposes accounting and tax fraud provides as
much service to the 'truth finding process' as an SEC investigator." Id. However, the underlying
motive for bringing the suit may be significantly different between a government employee and a
private law firm.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court illustrated this by stating that a private litigant stands in the same position as
the government. Id. When litigants act as private attorneys, they vindicate the public interest. Id.
Thus, the court felt "a difficult and fretful line-drawing process begins, consuming immeasurable
private and judicial resources in a vain attempt to distinguish one private litigant from the next." Id.
173. Id. The court appeared to be almost disappointed that the government would consider the
selective waiver notion. See id. "The investigatory agencies of the Government should act to bring
to light illegal activities, not to assist wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public
domain." Id.
174. Id. (quoting United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997)). The Sixth Circuit
bolstered this proposition by illustrating the notion that the government not only has other means of
obtaining this information, but can obtain this information in means that do not restrict the public
from accessing it at a later time. Id. Although this proposition may be true, the court correctly notes
the downside: "a higher cost in time and money." Id. (citing MIT, 129 F.3d at 685). One further
important observation is that taxpayer dollars are at stake, not private litigants' money.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 304. Tactical decisions are commonly accompanied by a risk of loss. See id. By
rejecting the selective waiver, the court believed that the likelihood that future attorneys would take
such a risk would decrease, given the consistency with which most courts have decided this matter.
Id.
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line of reasoning to follow. 17 7 Similar to this decision, the Westinghouse
court held that disclosing information to the government "has little
relevance" to the unique role of an attorney as a confidential counselor. 78
The D.C. Circuit is another circuit court to reject the waiver, as seen in
Permian Corp. v. United States, 79 which held that cooperation with a
governmental agency is laudable but does not advance the purposes of the
attorney-client privilege. 80 In rejecting the "some selective waiver," the
D.C. Circuit found that allowing the selective waiver for some and not other
cases will only give attorneys another tool for manipulation.18 ' Because the
so-called "middle ground"--allowing a selective waiver only after a valid
confidentiality form is signed-is taken by many courts, an 8important
issue
2
is raised: what does a valid confidentiality agreement entail?'
C. The Middle-Ground: The Formationof a Valid Confidentiality
Agreement
The "middle-ground" approach allows the selective waiver as long as a
valid confidentiality agreement is written and signed by both parties.8 3 The
confidentiality agreement should be clear, unambiguous, and drafted with
the government.184 The Permian decision illustrated that if the document or
documents are unclear, it is unlikely the court will find a confidentiality

177. Id. The court noted that just as the attorney-client privilege provides confidence that
information relayed to one's attorney will not be disclosed, rejection of selective waiver also
provides certainty that waiver of the privilege will lead to the disclosure of information. Id. This
line of reasoning-that disclosure was a risk to which counsel subjected their client-was
acknowledged by the corporate counsel during oral argument. Id. The court found that "counsel...
arrived at the decision to enter into the agreement with the Government after contemplating the
possibility the agreement would not protect its confidential information." Id. at 304 n.23.
178. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir.
1991). The Third Circuit noted the opposing argument that a selective waiver might increase
voluntary cooperation with government investigations. Id. The court explained that a new privilege
must "promote[] sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence." Id.
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). However, the court found that there is
"little reason to believe.., that this interest outweighs 'the fundamental principle that "the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence .... Id. at 1425-26 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC,
493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)).
179. 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
180. Id. at 1220-21.
181. Id. at 1221.
182. See id. at 1221-22. Forming a valid confidentiality agreement may be the determinative
factor as to whether a selective waiver is permitted. See id. Thus, a proper formation of the
confidentiality agreement is essential. Id.
183. See, e.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
184. Burke, supra note 123, at 64. A confidentiality agreement may be drafted in numerous ways,
including by a stipulation before the court, or during a settlement with the government. Id.
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agreement to exist.' 85 Disclosure should also be curtailed for the specific
government agency to whom the corporation is interested in disclosing
information. 8 6 A properly-drafted confidentiality agreement may state, for
Exchange
instance, that the Enforcement Division of the Securities 8 and
7
Commission is the only party to whom disclosure is allowed.
The party should ask the government agency whether it is willing to
take the actions necessary to protect the documents, if needed. 8 8 Similarly,
the corporation should note the ways in which the confidentiality agreement
works against the current investigation, or will work against a future
investigation. 89 Most importantly, the corporation should not take any steps
to produce documents until a valid confidentiality order is in place.' 90
D. The Work ProductDoctrine in Relation to the Selective Waiver
The work product doctrine is commonly addressed side-by-side with the
attorney-client privilege in a court's analysis of the selective waiver.' 9'
Some courts have come to the conclusion that the standards for waiver of the

185. See id. (citing Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217-18). The Permian court found "that a series of
letters between the parties" was probably insufficient to establish the unambiguous and complete
agreement that the Steinhardtcourt had in mind. See id. (citing Permian,665 F.2d at 1217-18).
186. Id. at 64-65. This portion is crucial. For example, if the SEC was to disclose material to the
DOJ, and the DOJ was subsequently sued for failure to disclose documents, the DOJ may be
required to disclose documents under the FOIA because the DOJ was not the governmental entity
that entered into a confidentiality agreement. However, if the SEC does not disclose the documents
to others, the conflicts with the FOIA are much less troublesome.
187. Id. at 64-66. Author Burke gave an example of a properly drafted confidentiality order. Id.
"The government entity agrees that the disclosing of the specific documents is privileged and
confidential. The privileged materials and information provided to the government entity pursuant
to this Agreement are provided solely for the limited purpose of cooperation in the
investigation[] ....
." Id. at 65. Burke continued, "[tihe government further recognizes that the
disclosing party continues to assert all such applicable privileges." Id. This somewhat boilerplate
example may not always be sufficient. A thorough review of pertinent case law hints that the more
specific the confidentiality agreement is to the corporation's specific situation, the higher the
likelihood that it will be honored. See id.
188. Id. at 66. Burke warned that the corporation should question whether the government is
willing to take affirmative steps to protect the information. Id. Such steps would include defending
lawsuits against the Commission for a release of the documents. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 64.
189. Burke, supra note 123, at 66. For instance, if the government is going to later bring a
criminal case against members of the corporation, then the agreement should specifically state what
exactly will be barred from admission into that case, and what will be permitted. Id.
190. Id. at 67 ("A party should not make the mistake of letting the horse out of the barn before
closing the barn door.").
191. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993).
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attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are dissimilar;1 92
these courts typically find that the attorney-client privilege is "easier"
to
194
waive. 9' The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support this notion.
Corporations may argue that investigative materials not covered by the
attorney-client privilege are nevertheless protected by the work product
doctrine. In truth, the comprehensive protection of the attorney-client
privilege is not as extensive as the protection offered by the work product
doctrine.' 95 However, the work product doctrine may be abrogated in
special circumstances. 96 In particular, if the work product contains
"relevant," non-privileged facts and the party seeking disclosure of the
information can overcome the burden of proving "adequate reasons" for
allowing discovery, the privilege is overcome. 97 This
applies even to an
198
attorney's opinions, judgments, and thought processes.
The In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare court held that voluntary
disclosure abrogated the attorney-client privilege, and, although initially
differentiating between the protections,' 99 the court further found that the
disclosure affected the work product doctrine. 20 0 The court stated that there
192. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The work product
privilege, in contrast to the attorney-client privilege, "does not exist to protect a confidential
relationship, but rather to promote the adversary system by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's
trial preparations from the discovery attempts of the opponent." Id. (emphasis deleted) (citing
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)). "A disclosure made in the pursuit of such trial
preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should be allowed
without waiver of the privilege." Id.
193. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (comparing the
"strict standard of waiver in the attorney-client privilege context with the more liberal standard
applicable to the work product privilege"); AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1299.
194. The work product privilege is explicitly protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
195. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977). The Diversified
court found "that the qualified immunity or privilege accorded to 'work product' by the rule is to
some extent broader than the absolute attorney-client privilege that has been discussed." Id.
196. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
197. See id. The party seeking discovery must show "substantial need" and inability to obtain the
information elsewhere without "undue hardship." Id.
198. Note that this requires more than "substantial need" and "undue hardship," but is still
possible. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-10 (1947).
199. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 304 (6th Cir.
2002). The court explicitly stated that "[e]ven if [Columbia/HCA] is deemed to have waived the
attorney-client privilege [1, this does not necessarily mean that [Columbia/HCA] also has waived
work product immunity." Id. (quoting Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 951 F.
Supp. 679,689 (W.D. Mich. 1996)).
200. Id. at 306. The court noted that there is no compelling reason to treat the work product
protection and the attorney-client privilege differently. Id. The court found that the rationale for
disallowing the selective waiver in the attorney-client privilege context similarly applies to the work
product doctrine. Id. This reasoning was supported in that "[t]he ability to prepare one's case in
confidence, which is the chief reason articulated in Hickan... for the work product protections has
little to do with talking to the Government." Id. The court held that even more so than a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, the waiver of the work product doctrine is a tactical decision. Id.
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should not be a significant difference between the treatment of the two
protections.2 °'
However, the work product doctrine is distinct from the attorney-client
privilege. The work product doctrine, as discussed above, is broader than
the attorney-client privilege in some respects. 2 2 The Permian court
illustrated the difference between the two. 20 3 It dismissed any notion of
selective waiver with regard to the attorney-client privilege, but upheld the
D.C. Circuit court's finding that the agreement between Occidental and the
SEC preserved the work product protection. 204 However, this analysis has
followed the opposite
not been universally adopted. The Steinhardt court
20 5
simultaneously.
protections
both
rejecting
view in
Ironically, the Eighth Circuit-the only circuit to have found in favor of
the selective waiver-has found a waiver of the work product doctrine while
concurrently holding the attorney-client privilege intact.20 6 In the Eighth
Circuit case, In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program
Litigation, Chrysler disconnected the odometers on vehicles so the "quality
control" workers could take the cars home for a "test drive. ' 20 7 After this
Because both the attorney and the client know that "the material in question was prepared in
anticipation of litigation," the decision to "show your hand" is a quintessential example of litigation
strategy. Id. at 306-07. "Like [the] attorney-client privilege, there is no reason to transform the
work product doctrine into another 'brush on the attorney's palette,' used as a sword rather than a
shield." Id. (quoting In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
201. Id.at306-07.
202. See generallysupra Part III.
203. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Permian court
explained that the attorney-client privilege "exists to protect confidential communications" and to
assure the client that statements made while "seeking legal advice will be kept strictly
confidential .... " Id. (quoting United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Further, a voluntary disclosure of such information is contrary to the confidential relationship and
thus waives the attorney-client privilege. Id. (citing AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1299). However, in
differentiating the work product doctrine, the court found that "[a] disclosure made in the pursuit of
such trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should be
allowed without waiver of the [work product] privilege." Id. (quotingAT&T, 642 F.2d at 1299).
204. Id. at 1215.
205. In re Steinhardt,9 F.3d at 236. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's findings
that Steinhardt had voluntarily disclosed the work product to an adversary. Id. at 234. Therefore,
neither the policy considerations behind the work product doctrine nor the attorney-client privilege
merited the creation of an exception to the waiver rule. See id. at 236.
206. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977); cf In re Chrysler
Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 845 (8th Cir. 1988).
207. In re Chrysler Motors, 860 F.2d at 845. Chrysler defended their "test-drive" program as a
quality-control measure. Id. Chrysler was charged "with sixteen counts of mail fraud and odometer
fraud." Id. The allegations stated that "as many as 60,000 new vehicles had been driven with
disconnected odometers." Id. The class action was transferred to the Eastern District of Missouri,
and Chrysler agreed to settle the civil litigation. Id.

"test drive" program was uncovered, both the government and private law

firms brought suit against Chrysler.20 8 Chrysler had an independent auditor
prepare an audit to determine how many cars had been driven off Chrysler
facilities during this program.2 °9 Chrysler presented this report to the outside
counsel of a class action pursuant to a confidentiality agreement,210 but
refused to hand this analysis over to the government who subsequently
brought a suit to compel disclosure of this report.21
The Eighth Circuit determined "that Chrysler waived any work product
protection by voluntarily disclosing the computer tape to its adversaries, the
class action plaintiffs, during the due diligence phase of the settlement

negotiations., 21 2 The court reasoned that Chrysler's confidentiality
agreement with the class action plaintiffs had
no bearing: 213 the linchpin of
24
the work product doctrine is confidentiality.
The First Circuit has upheld the rule that upon disclosure, the work
product doctrine's protections dissolve.2 5 In MIT, the First Circuit held that

208. See id.
209. Id. The class action liaison and independent auditor were instructed to complete the due
diligence review of Chrysler's documentation in regard to the "Overnight Evaluation Program." Id.
Chrysler identified the "vehicles by referring to the gate pass" (a pass given to the vehicle, allowing
it to leave the plant) whenever a car left the lot. Id. Gate pass documentation included the time the
vehicle left the plant, the type of vehicle, and whether the vehicle left the plant for company
purposes or for the "Overnight Evaluation Program." Id. Even the vehicle identification number
and the driver of the vehicle were listed in the documentation. Id. The class action liaison was
provided with access to all of the gate passes. Id. The incriminating information included in this
disclosure is evident. See id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 846. The court first addressed whether the tape in question was opinion work product,
which is protected more stringently than ordinary work product. Id. Finding the tape to be merely
"ordinary work product," the court found that "the government has made the necessary showing of
substantial need and undue hardship to overcome the ordinary work product privilege." Id. at 847.
Thus, the work product doctrine protected Chrysler until it disclosed the document to an adversarythe class-action plaintiffs. Id. at 846. At that time, the protection was waived, even if the disclosure
ended in settlement. Id. The court noted that "[t]he work product doctrine was designed to prevent
unwarranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney' and recognizes that it is
'essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel."' Id. (quoting Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 400
(1987) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11(1947))). Once the information was made
public, the need to prevent unwarranted inquiries into the mental impressions of the attorneys was no
longer present. See id. at 846-47.
213. Id. at 847. The court's reasoning behind denying recognition to the confidentiality
agreement is that a common interest always exists between opposing parties in any attempt at
settlement. Id. Furthermore, the fact that Chrysler and the co-liaison counsel struck an agreement to
keep the material confidential has no bearing because it was not kept confidential. Id.
214. Id. The court held that by disclosing the information to opposing counsel, Chrysler was, in
effect, disclosing the material to the public and abrogating any protections that may have existed at
that time. Id.
215. See United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997).
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the work product privilege is waived when information is disclosed to an
adversary, regardless of any confidentiality agreement.21 6

The Third Circuit noted that the standard for waiving the work product
doctrine should not be more stringent than the standard for waiving the
attorney-client privilege.2" 7 The policy behind the work product doctrine is
to allow attorneys to act without the fear that their work will be used against

their clients, thereby ensuring that the adversarial process operates
efficiently.2 18 In rejecting the validity of a confidentiality agreement to bar
access to an attorney's work product, the Third Circuit stated that once the

corporation had disclosed privileged information, it could not then rely upon

the confidentiality agreement to protect itself.21 9 This argument can be
supported on public policy grounds as well. If the corporation (or

independent, outside counsel) is preparing information which it knows will
later be used by a government agency, the investigatory body may be

reluctant to discover information that might not help its claim, but is

216. Id. MIT made a disclosure to an audit agency. Id. at 686-87. This disclosure did not occur
in litigation, in which the parties shared a common interest. Id. The court explained that the audit
committee's actions were critical in determining whether or not it was an adversary. See id. The
audit committee "review[ed] MIT's expense submissions," something the court thought of as
adversarial in nature. Id. at 687. Another salient point the court made was that adversarial parties
are identified not by the subjective hope of the disclosing party, but by whether the investigation is
adversarial. Id. The court ruled against the work product protection in this instance because of the
"prevailing rule that disclosure to an adversary, real or potential, forfeits work product protection."
Id. While stating that the work product may be overcome with a sufficient showing of need, the
court found such circumstance not to apply in this case. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
"[T]he potential for dispute and even litigation was certainly there... [t]he cases treat this situation
as one in which the work product protection is deemed forfeit." MIT, 129 F.3d at 687.
217. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir.
1991).
218. Id. at 1429. The court felt that "an exception for disclosures to government agencies is not
necessary to further the doctrine's purpose; attorneys are still free to prepare their cases without fear
of disclosure to an adversary as long as they and their clients refrain from making such disclosures
themselves." Id.
219. Id. at 1431. The Third Circuit's rationale was founded upon the difference between the two
protections' underlying framework. Id. The attorney-client privilege is waived upon disclosure to a
third party, unless the disclosure is "necessary to further the goal of enabling the client to seek
informed legal assistance." Id. at 1428. However, because the work product doctrine protects the
attorney's work product from being disclosed to an adversary, disclosure to a third party will not
automatically waive the privilege-the waiver must be to an adversary. Id. Because the court places
such emphasis on the fact that a waiver of the work product doctrine must follow disclosure to an
adversary, the relevant issue becomes, again, the definition of an adversary. Id. at 1431. "Thus, had
the DOJ and the SEC not been Westinghouse's adversaries, and had we concluded that
Westinghouse reasonably expected the agencies to keep the material that it disclosed to them
confidential, we might reach a different result." Id.

nevertheless illegal. 220
This will prevent attorneys from adequately
preparing a case against the corporation.221

The Ninth Circuit was recently confronted with the selective waiver but
did not authoritatively rule on whether or not it would be permitted. In
United States v. Bergonzi,2 22 the Ninth Circuit faced a selective waiver issue

stemming from a related California state court proceeding.223 The California
court considered arguments from both sides:
As the Legislature has not explicitly set out the parameters for
waiver of work product protection, we are, perhaps, slightly less
constrained in determining the bounds of the doctrine .... But an

assurance of work product protection would certainly act as a carrot
to encourage cooperation with the government.
Also, the
employment of outside counsel to investigate alleged corporate
wrongdoing is a laudable practice, which presumably would be
encouraged by an assurance of work product protection. 24
Although the California state court ruled against allowing a selective

waiver, it clarified who it believed should solve the selective waiver
problem: "[g]iven the Legislature's expressed desire to control evidentiary
privileges and protections,
adoption of the selective waiver theory should
225
come from that body.

220. See id.
at 1431.
221. Seeid.
222. 403 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2005).
223. The state court decision, McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812 (Ct.
App. 2004), answered the selective waiver concern. In this case, shareholder lawsuits were filed
when improperly-recognized revenues came into light. Id. at 814-15. Skadden Arps, the law firm
hired to represent McKesson, told the US Attorneys Office and the SEC that it was willing to
disclose confidential information with proper confidentiality agreements in place. Id. at 815. The
agreement was met, and Skadden Arps disclosed the material. Id. The agreements attempted to
maintain the work product protection and the attorney-client privilege by stating that the firm and the
SEC have a common interest in finding whether there were improperly-recorded revenues. Id.
However, the court found that "McKesson waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to the
audit committee report and interview memoranda." Id. at 819. The court reached a similar
conclusion in regard to attorney-client privileged material. Id. at 821.
224. Id. at 820. The Ninth Circuit, however, declined to address the issue, explaining that "we do
not reach McKesson's argument that we should recognize a form of 'selective' or 'partial' waiver
that would allow a corporation to disclose the results of an internal investigation to an investigating
government agency without waiving attorney-client privilege or work product protection as to the
outside world." Bergonzi, 403 F.3d at 1050. The court concluded, "[w]hether the sort of selective
waiver McKesson seeks is available in this Circuit is an open question." Id. Given that the Ninth
Circuit did not overturn the lower court decision, it is possible that it will decide the issue, if it must,
in line with the majority view: no selective waiver permitted for either the work product protected or
attorney-client privileged documents. However, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit would rather
defer to the legislature on the question of selective waiver.
225. McKesson HBOC, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 821.
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V.

ISSUES ON THE SELECTIVE WAIVER HORIZON

A more recent development in Supreme Court case law that has a direct
effect in corporate investigations can be found in the Court's holdings in
227
United States v. Booker226 and United States v. Fanfan.
These cases,
decided by the Court on the same day, held the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines to be unconstitutional. 22 8 This move provides judges with greater
discretion in sentencing criminals, including white-collar criminals.22 9 The
abrogation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is particularly relevant
when discussing the selective waiver. Because the sentencing guidelines are

now simply advisory and not mandatory, jurists have much more power with
which to decide jail time. 230

For example, the DOJ had been using the

guidelines to induce pleas, but that leverage has markedly diminished. 3
Ironically, white-collar criminals who are unable to reach pre-trial pleas
and are often convicted by juries will likely benefit from Booker and

Fanfan.232 The sentencing guidelines list a series of factors that the jury is to
consider when increasing or decreasing a prison sentence.233

For white-

collar crimes, the factors for sentencing a corporate executive include: (1)
"the amount of money involved in the fraud;" (2) "the extent of their

226. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005)
227. 125 S. Ct. 12 (2005).
228. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. The Court found the guidelines to be unconstitutional because
they denied the defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee to the right of trial by jury. Id. at 743. The
constitutional violation occurred because judges were required to make factual determinations about
issues that were not presented to jurors, such as whether the defendant displayed remorse or played a
leadership role in a particular criminal conspiracy. Id. Justice Breyer specifically called on
Congress to fix the problem, noting that "[tihe ball now lies in Congress' court." Id. at 768.
229. See Mike France & Lorraine Woellert, Corporate Cases: Time to Cut a Deal?, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 24, 2005, at 43. The Court's decision was extremely timely--during the period in which some
of the most infamous corporate crooks were facing trial, the Court repealed much of the leverage
held by the DOJ and the SEC. Id. However, in the "longer-term, other execs could suffer if
Congress rewrites the Sentencing Guidelines to punish unpopular business criminals more harshly
than the old system did." Id.
230. See id.
231. See id. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were generally considered harsh and less lenient
than the sentences most jurists would give. See id. The legal community recognizes that many
federal judges may issue more lenient sentences now that they are given the discretion to do so. See
id.
232. See id. In the short term, corporate criminals will have more leverage when negotiating
pleas. Id. CEOs and corporate executives may now be able to withhold disclosure of pertinent facts
that would have been disclosed as part of the previously mandated "cooperat[ion] with
investigators." See id. After Booker and Fanfan, this call for cooperation is only advisory, not
mandatory. Id.
233. See id.

755

supervisory and fiduciary responsibilities;" (3) "the vulnerability of the
victims;"

and,
most importantly, (4)
23 4

"whether they cooperated with

investigators.

Because juries primarily take into account whether a defendant
"cooperated with investigators" when determining to increase or decrease a
235
sentence, 23
the existence of the selective waiver becomes extremely

relevant. If a selective waiver is passed through legislation, Congress will,
in effect, nullify any detriment a corporation may face from private
litigants.236 Juries will view corporations in a more favorable light because

corporations would likely quickly disclose any incriminating evidence in the
hope of gaining the benefit of this mitigating factor.1 7 While Booker and
Fanfan could lead to more lenient sentences for a given crime, Congress

must consider these decisions if, or when, it drafts a selective waiver. A true
limited waiver, if passed during this current wave of corporate malfeasance,
may benefit corporate criminals much more than it would benefit taxpayers
and government investigations.238
Another current issue is whether or not a corporation should have to
admit guilt when entering into a settlement with the government.239 If a
corporation has broken the law, the SEC will usually settle with the
corporation. 240 The settlement language as to the corporation's culpability is

generally phrased as "[we] neither admit nor deny" guilt.24' This language
allows a corporation to escape guilt in the public eye because it has not

234. Id. (emphasis added). Since a white-collar case tends to involve much more money than a
typical criminal case, the "amount of money" factor weighs heavily against defendants. See id. This
results in aggravating factors outweighing any mitigating factors. Id. In addition, because the
guidelines are now merely advisory, the factor encompassing "cooperat[ion] with investigators" will
likely not have as much bearing as it once did. See id.
235. See id.
236. For example, if a corporation were to withhold information-thereby disabling itself from
using its cooperation with investigators as a mitigating factor in sentencing-it would do so because
the corporation does not want the disclosed information to result in the filing of class action suits by
private litigants. However, if a selective waiver is passed, then corporations will likely disclose
incriminating information to the fullest extent possible because it will not fear subsequent lawsuits
from private litigants (save the exception of trying to cover up crime from the government, although
this is generally of much less of a concern than class-action suits). Therefore, the greatest advantage
of withholding information will become a moot issue, and a corporation's cooperation with
investigators will be a strong mitigating factor in the sentencing analysis. Corporations will disclose
information freely in order to reap the rewards as disclosure becomes a mitigating factor at
sentencing.
237. See id. Whether this is the case will be determined as the effects of Booker and Fanfan
unfold. Id. (noting that "it may be premature for corporate defendants to pop the champagne.").
238. See id.
239. See Adrienne Carter & Amy Borrus, What ifCompanies Fessed Up?, BUS.'WK., Jan. 24,
2005, at 59.
240. See id.
241. Id.
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expressly admitted engaging in illegal activity.242 While the SEC is
currently considering reforming this practice, requiring an admission of guilt
has far-reaching effects.243 First, it will drive up the cost of government
investigations. 2" Corporations will fight much harder if an admission of
guilt is at stake.2 45 Further, the SEC staff of roughly 3,100 does not have the
resources to file suit against every corporation that has broken the law.246

Given that the stakes would be larger if a corporation was found guilty, it
would likely be extremely hesitant to disclose confidential information.
Thus, a selective waiver would have virtually no benefit.247

If companies are coerced into admitting guilt, plaintiffs' attorneys will

have a significantly easier time creating a case against the corporation. 2481

This may result in the disappearance of the selective waiver: there will be no
benefit whatsoever for a corporation to enter into a selective disclosure
agreement with the government if what the government finds will be used

against the corporation to force it to admit guilt.249 If a corporation does not
admit guilt and instead chooses to fight the government in court, the
outcome of that case will determine whether private
litigants may "ride the
250

coattails" of the government in their own suits.

242. Id. at 59-60. While those in the legal and business communities recognize that a corporation
would not pay $500 million without reason, investors do not know what the "admit nor deny"
language reveals, if anything. Use of this language allows CEOs and CFOs to turn around their
plank walk and act as though they did nothing illegal. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. Id. The SEC acknowledges that requiring a corporation to acknowledge wrongdoing would
drive up costs tremendously. See id. Last year, the SEC brought 639 cases. Id. If an admission of
guilt was the aim, the Commission would only have been able to bring a fraction of them. Id.
Requiring the SEC to push for sweeping admissions of guilt "would be a terrible waste of
government resources," because, with so much at stake, corporations would undoubtedly fight until
the end to avoid this admission. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id. If the goal of a selective waiver is to encourage corporate disclosure that would help
the government "root out" criminal activity, this goal will be frustrated-a corporation will no
longer have the incentive to help the SEC once it knows that the SEC is expecting it to admit guilt,
because it will fear that private litigants will "ride the coattails" of the SEC and bring their own civil
suits. See id.
248. See id. "Under long-standing legal rules, admissions made in governmental proceedings can
be entered as evidence in private litigation." Id. at 60. This will significantly reduce the burden of
proof on plaintiffs' attorneys bringing an action against the same corporation. Id. In some cases, it
will render the corporations completely defenseless. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
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Selective disclosure will also be relevant if social security is invested

into private accounts. If this occurs, Wall Street will experience a huge
influx of wealth within a relatively short period of time. 25' The security of
this money will not only be vital to the retirement of millions of Americans,
but will have a significant impact on the American economy as well 2 As
the past has taught us, the government must keep a watchful eye on the
managers of this money.253

The selective waiver would enable the

government to investigate wrongdoing without private plaintiffs' firms
254
winning large class action lawsuits and taking money out of the pot.
Thus, unlike the "neither admit nor deny" scenario, a selective waiver in the
social security context may be necessary. 255

251. See Amy Borrus, Windfall on Wall Street?, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 76.
252. See id. ("No question there's big money to be made down the road. The estimated $54
billion that could pour into the markets is roughly a quarter of stock and bond mutual funds' annual
take now.").
253. Id. Every investment branch of every investment agency will lobby for a portion of the
money. Id. Banks will lobby for CODs. Id. Insurers will lobby that retirees should be forced to
convert private accounts into annuities. 1d. The most important decision to be made will be who
gets this windfall, and how that investment firm is policed. See id.
254. Not allowing a selective waiver in this instance could prove horrifying. Imagine that a firm
steals a large amount of money from a pension fund that is linked to the privatized social security
accounts. The government conducts an investigation, finds the firm liable, and forces it to return the
money. Predictably, a plaintiffs' law firm will bring suit using the documents subpoenaed by the
government. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609-17 (8th Cir. 1977).
Unfortunately, roughly a third (possibly less if the settlement is in the tens of millions of dollars or
more because of the mitigated attorneys' fees received upon large settlements) of the money will go
to the attorneys' fees, not back to the investors. This outcome is similar to what currently occurs in
situations involving corporate theft. See id. However, there is one significant difference. In the
corporate setting, very few people rely directly on that stock or income derived from that stock for
their sole retirement basis. If social security is diversified into the markets, the money invested in
the privatized equity markets will be a portion of the total amount of benefits to be paid to
Americans upon retirement. Allowing plaintiffs' lawyers to collect large fees will inevitably lead to
smaller payouts over time for the individuals who have chosen to invest in the markets. This will
reduce the net effect of the increased returns offered by the private markets over the current
government return on the monies invested in social security pension accounts.
255. This scenario may call for something more than a narrow "limited waiver" or "selective
disclosure." For example, if the government alone were allowed to prosecute these cases,
subsequently returning the money to the social security fund, the outcome would benefit the
investing public without depleting the public's retirement accounts through attorneys' fees.
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VI. CONCLUSION

In common law, the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine are premised on the beliefs that an attorney should be able to
communicate fully and frankly with his or her clients, and that an attorney's
work product should be protected from discovery. 256 But when a
corporation faces an investigation by a .government agency, allowing the
materials discovered by the agency to be used by a plaintiffs firm against
the corporation hinders the government's investigation by slowing its
progress and decreasing the amount of disclosure provided. 257 But it is true
that if a corporation breaks the law, the government should not aid it by
hiding its crimes; such action would result in increased costs to taxpayers
due to the inefficiency arising in the investigation.
Allowing a special waiver will increase the corporation's ability to
effectively disclose material to the government and would allow the
discovery process to operate both smoothly and more efficiently. 58 Further,
corporations should not be able to selectively disclose material to the
government only to withhold the same materials to other opponents for
tactical reasons. Allowing such a process would simply aid corporations in
further manipulation of the legal system.
A middle ground must be struck. The possibility of allowing a selective
waiver in certain scenarios should be legislated. The SEC is understaffed,
underfinanced, and too overburdened to punish those who have broken the
law and effectively deter those who may in the future. Private plaintiffs'
firms-although possibly receiving a windfall-may be the necessary
parties to achieve the deterrence and punishment necessary to stop corporate
fraud.

256. See supra Parts I & II. The Supreme Court noted that impairment of these privileges would
"not only make[] it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is
faced with a specific legal problem but also threaten[] to limit the valuable efforts of corporate
counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 392 (1981).
257. Brodsky et al., supra note 1, at 1. For example, when a company discloses information to
auditors about the handling of allegations, it risks waiving the privileges affecting legal work,
analyses, advice of counsel, and witness interviews. Id. at 6. This material is at the heart of
companies' expectations as to what will be protected from actual and potential adversaries. Id.
When the disclosure of this information becomes a pressing concern, corporations will inevitably
withhold as much as legally possible. Id.
258. See supraParts IV & V.

However, it may not be practical for certain corporations or industries to
utilize the selective waiver. The proper resolution of this issue through
legislation is essential. The outcome will affect nearly every government
corporate investigation, thousands of plaintiffs' law firms, and almost every
corporation that operates in America.

9

Zach Dostart2 6

259. See generally Brodsky et al., supra note 1, at 1. Companies expect the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine to be protected by courts. Id. If the privileges vanish, there
is the risk that counsel's work product will be turned over to opponents in litigation through
discovery, and corporations may then become discouraged to seek counsel when they need it the
most. The fact that operating an honest corporation and fully cooperating in an investigatory process
may lead to different results must be remedied through legislation. See id.
260. JD/MBA Candidate, Pepperdine University, Class of 2007. I would like to thank my parents
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